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Abstract—Passwords are widely used for client to server
authentication as well as for encrypting data stored in untrusted
environments, such as cloud storage. Both, authentication and
encrypted cloud storage, are usually discussed in isolation. In this
work, we propose AuthStore, a flexible authentication framework
that allows users to securely reuse passwords for authentication
as well as for encrypted cloud storage at a single or multiple
service providers. Users can configure how secure passwords are
protected using password stretching techniques. We present a
compact password-authenticated key exchange protocol (Com-
pactPAKE) that integrates the retrieval of password stretching
parameters. A parameter attack is described and we show how
existing solutions suffer from this attack. Furthermore, we
introduce a password manager that supports CompactPAKE.
Index Terms—Password-based Authentication, Privacy-
preserving Cloud Storage, Authentication Protocol, Password
Manager, Single Password
I. INTRODUCTION
For authentication as well as for protecting digital assets,
passwords are a simple, usable, and commonly used solu-
tion [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]. The ubiquitously use of passwords
encourages the reuse of passwords for multiple services [6],
[7], [8]. However, this has important security and privacy
implications since a leaked password gives an attacker access
to multiple services, e.g., to impersonate a user or to decrypt
password-protected confidential user data.
Service providers often fail to store user passwords securely,
e.g., passwords are stored in plain text or weakly protected [9].
In general, it is unclear for users if and how service providers
keep user passwords confidentially and, even worse, a service
provider may itself be malicious and use a user password to
impersonate a user at other service providers. For instance, a
web service provider can readout the user passwords straight
from the login page by recording keystrokes [10] and so gain
knowledge of all passwords entered by the user.
Passwords are not only used for authentication but also to
encrypt data that can then be stored in potentially untrusted
environments [4], [5]. Here, it is important to remark that
password-based authentication protocols should not leak the
password to ensure that storage providers are unable to recover
data that is encrypted with the same password [11], [12].
Unfortunately, the discussion of a secure password-based
authentication schemes is often neglected [13], [14], [4], [5],
[15], [16], which can compromise secure data encryption.
For example, BoxCryptor1 supports a set of cloud storage
providers as a storage back end. If the same password is
used for BoxCryptor and for the storage providers a malicious
storage provider can decrypt the stored data. Furthermore,
encrypted storage providers, such as BoxCryptor or Mega2,
let users authenticate on their web page with the encryption
password. This makes it possible for them to learn the plain
password straight from their login page [10].
A solution is that a user can choose two different passwords:
one for authentication and one for data encryption [17].
However, this solution suffers from usability concerns as it
requires users to memorise two different passwords. Identity
and access delegation solutions, such as OpenID Connect3 or
OAuth4, avoid the use of passwords by using a trusted identity
or authorisation server. However, this approach only shifts the
problem since an attacker who gains access to the authorisation
server or the server itself may learn the user password.
In this paper, we present a novel framework called
AuthStore. AuthStore supports secure password-based authen-
tication and ensures that the user password is not revealed to
the service provider. The user password is secured from offline
dictionary attacks [18] by using key stretching techniques [19].
By storing all key stretching parameters directly at the service
provider our solution does not require any extra server and
only username and password are required for a successful
authentication. The user is in full control of how secure
the password is protected and stored at the service provider.
Furthermore, for service providers that offer data storage,
AuthStore integrates secure password-based data encryption.
Our design makes it possible to securely reuse a single
password for both authentication and privacy-preserving data
storage at multiple service providers.
There are many password-based authentication proto-
cols [20], [21], [22] but none of them assume the exchange
of key stretching parameters. We introduce a parameter attack
that a service provider can perform during the user authenti-
cation with the goal to void the key stretching mechanism in
order to make offline dictionary attacks easier. We show how
1www.boxcryptor.com
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3openid.net/connect
4oauth.net
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existing solutions, which assume strengthen passwords in the
authentication protocol, suffer from parameter attacks.
We present the CompactPAKE protocol that includes the
exchange of key stretching parameters and is resistant against
parameter attacks. CompactPAKE is based on a proven secure
Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol but
requires only four message passes between a user client and a
service provider [22], [23]. CompactPAKE is an asymmetric
authentication protocol, which means an attacker who com-
promises the service provider is not able to impersonate the
user.
In a case study, we present a flexible AuthStore-based
password manager that allows the secure storage of credentials
in the cloud [24], [25]. This makes our solution not only
useful for service providers that use CompactPAKE but also
for securely storing credentials for conventional password
protocols. We show how our password manager can speed up
registration and authentication at service providers that sup-
port CompactPAKE. Furthermore, even without the password
manager users are able to authenticate at service providers that
uses CompactPAKE.
Our contributions can be summarised as follows:
1) We propose AuthStore, a framework for secure single
password authentication and password-protected, privacy-
preserving cloud storage at a single or multiple service
providers.
2) We present CompactPAKE, an asymmetric PAKE proto-
col with key stretching parameter retrieval that is secure
against parameter attacks and only uses four message
passes between a client and a service provider.
3) A password manager that uses AuthStore to securely
store arbitrary credentials in the cloud and that makes
registration and authentication at service providers that
support CompactPAKE faster and easier.
II. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
In the following, we define some core system requirements:
Simplicity. The only information required by a user to authen-
ticate and to register at a service provider is her username and
password. No other mechanism or service, such as a trusted
key server, is required by the user.
Secure Password Storage. The user must be able to configure
how much an authentication password is strengthened before
it is stored at a service provider, i.e., the user is in control
of how strong a password is secured from offline dictionary
attacks.
Secure Authentication. The used authentication protocol
must ensure that no information about the password is leaked
to any party, i.e., dictionary attacks are impossible. This
includes that a service provider should not be able to learn
any information about the entered password, e.g., a mistakenly
entered password used at a different service provider.
An attacker who compromises a service provider must not
be able to impersonate the user using the stored authentication
data.
Data Storage. If a service provider supports data storage, a
user must be able to securely reuse the authentication password
to protect data without the risk that the service provider can
access the data.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In our system model, we have two main entities, i.e., the
user and the service provider. A user owns one or more
user accounts at one or more service providers. The user
communicates with a service provider through a trusted client
software. A user can authenticate at a service provider using
her username and user password. The service provider is
responsible to manage a set of user accounts and stores all
necessary parameters that are needed for the user authentica-
tion. Optionally, the service provider can offer data storage to
authenticated users. The user is responsible to protect the data,
e.g., encrypt data, through the client.
Threat Model. We assume that the service provider might
be malicious. The service provider may try to learn the user’s
clear text password in order to decrypt data that is encrypted
with the same password or to impersonate the user at a
different service provider.
In our approach, we use key stretching to protect the
user password [19]. We assume that the user chooses a user
password with reasonable strength [26], [2], [27], [28] and
strong key stretching parameters so that it becomes practically
infeasible for an attacker to recover the user password using
an offline dictionary attack.
External attackers may learn or guess the username and
try to impersonate the user. The attacker may try to perform
an online attack, guessing the user password. The attacker
may perform a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack to monitor
the authentication protocol. Moreover, the attacker may gain
access to the service provider in which case the attacker is
treated the same as the service provider.
Our Approach. In this work, we propose a framework
for password-based authentication and data encryption where
service providers are not necessarily trusted. In order to
strengthen the user password, we use a Key Derivation
Function (KDF) to derive a strong base key. In general, a
KDF takes a set of parameters that determine how strong a
derived key is protected from dictionary attacks. The KDF
parameters can be chosen by the user to control the trade-off
between authentication time (KDF evaluation at the client) and
password protection against possible attacks.
We use a simple but flexible method to derive an arbitrary
number of user keys from a base key. User keys can then be
used for authentication, data encryption, or other purposes.
This also means that a base key can safely be reused for
multiple purposes, even across multiple service providers. As
a result, the client can cache computationally expensive KDF
evaluations and then quickly derive user keys from the cached
values. All required parameters to derive a user key are stored
at the service provider.
The choice of a suitable authentication protocol is crucial
when using key stretching techniques. More specifically, even
if the password is strengthened, the key has to be treated as a
weak key in the authentication protocol (see more discussion
in Section IV-G). In our approach, we use an asymmetric
Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol [22]
that has the required properties. First, neither service providers
nor external attackers can learn any information about the
password used by the user. The service provider only learns
whether the user has provided the correct password or not.
This also means that the service provider cannot learn about
erroneously entered passwords. Second, a MitM attacker can-
not use the intercepted information for an offline dictionary
attack but is constrained to mount an online attack. Third, if
authentication data is stolen, it is insufficient to impersonate
the user.
To support secure data storage we derive a user key and use
this key to further protect arbitrary data encryption keys. This
provides the required bridge from secure authentication to se-
cure cloud storage. Since cloud storage can be highly domain
specific, we refer to existing work for concrete solutions [3],
[4], [5].
IV. SOLUTION DETAILS
In the following, we describe how a user can generate a
strong base key using key stretching (Section IV-A). From this
base key, a set of user keys can be generated (Section IV-B).
User keys are then used for authentication (Section IV-C) and
for secure data storage (Section IV-D). Moreover, we explain
how authentication credentials can be updated (Section IV-E
and how an account is reset (Section IV-F). We then analyse
the security of our solution (Section IV-G).
A. Password Strengthening
To strengthen the user password, a KDF is used [29], [30],
[31], [19]. In general, a KDF takes the password pw, a salt
value, and some cost parameters as input and returns a derive
key K. The cost parameters determine how expensive it is
to evaluate a KDF. For example, PDKDF2 uses an iteration
count [29] while more recent KDFs such as Argon2 [31] allow
users to specify memory requirements to hamper the use of
fast GPUs and specialised hardware. In the following, we refer
to salt and cost parameters as PK , which leads to the general
definition of a KDF:
K = KDF (PK , pw).
where K is the derived base key.
Fig. 1. Using a KDF, the user derives a base key K from the user password.
From the base key, an arbitrary number of user keys can be derived. These
user keys can be used for authentication Kauth and data encryption Kdata.
B. User Key Generation
To derive an arbitrary number of strong user keys from a
single password using a single KDF evaluation, we use the
following simple mechanism (see Figure 1). As a basis for a
user key Ku, a base key K is required. For each user key, a
random salt value is generated and Ku is derived as follows:
Ku = H(K, salt) = H(KDF (PK , pw), salt) = U(Pu, pw)
with a cryptographic one-way hash function H and the user
key parameters Pu = [PK , salt].
C. Registration and Authentication
For the purpose of authentication at a service provider, the
user derives a user key Kauth from the user password. For
brevity reason, it is referred to as: pi = Kauth. We use an
asymmetric PAKE protocol for authentication [22]. For this
protocol, the user requires the authentication key pi and the
service provider requires some verification value Vpi to verify
the users’ knowledge of pi. In general, Vpi can be a set of
values. In Section V, we describe a compact variant of an
asymmetric PAKE protocol and describe in detail how the
verification value Vpi is derived from pi.
For the registration of a user account, the user chooses the
user key parameters Ppi , derives Vpi (by first deriving pi), and
uploads Ppi and Vpi to the service provider. To authenticate,
the user requests Ppi from the service provider and derives the
login key pi, which is then used to authenticate using the PAKE
protocol. At a successful authentication, the PAKE protocol
produces a mutual secure session key sk which can be used
to protect further communication between client and service
provider [23]. In the following, we assume a secure connection
after authentication.
D. Secure Data Storage
If the AuthStore service provider offers data storage, the
user may ensure data confidentiality by employing encryption
techniques [3], [4], [5]. We show a simple but flexible ap-
proach of how data can be protected using the same password
as used for authentication.
For the encryption, the user generates some user key param-
eters Pu,data and derives a new user key Kdata. To minimise
the computational cost, the base key parameters PK that are
used to derive the authentication key pi can be reused, i.e., the
base key has already been derived for the authentication.
Instead of encrypting data directly with Kdata, we propose
a more flexible key chain approach5. This approach has
the advantage that multiple passwords can be supported and
passwords can be changed without the need to re-encrypt the
data [5]. Here, a random symmetric encryption key ksym is
generated and used for data encryption. ksym is then encrypted
with Kdata. We call the set of the encrypted key ksym and
Pu,data the data parameters Pdata = [enc(ksym), Pu,data]. The
encrypted data and Pdata can securely be stored at a service
provider.
5gitlab.com/groups/cryptsetup
E. Password Change and Key Update
To change the user password, a user chooses new user key
parameters P ′pi and derives V
′
pi from the new password. At a
successful authentication with the old password, P ′pi and V
′
pi
are updated at the service provider. The same approach can
be used to just update the user key parameters. This might
be desirable if more secure KDF parameters should be used
while reusing the existing password.
If encrypted data is stored at the service provider, a new
encryption key Kdata is generated, ksym is re-encrypted with
Kdata, and Pdata is updated at the service provider.
F. Account Reset
In case the user forgets her username or password used at
a certain service provider, traditional recovery methods can
be applied. For example, the user can request an account
reset through a trusted third party channel such as an ordinary
email account. In response, the service provider generates a
temporary random authentication key pi′ and the matching
verification value Vpi′ and sends the key pi′ to the user. The
user uses this authentication key to authenticate using the
normal protocol. Here the authentication key derivation step
is ignored since the authentication key pi′ is already known to
the user. After a successful authentication, the user chooses a
new password, as described above.
Recovering data that is protected with the lost user password
would require techniques such as secret sharing [32] or a local
key backup. However, this is incompatible with our simplicity
requirement.
G. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyse the security of AuthStore.
Moreover, we describe a novel parameter attack that targets
authentication schemes that include password stretching.
Key Derivation. In our approach, we use a cryptographic one-
way function to derive multiple user keys from a single base
key. This means just a leaked user key K ′u cannot be used
to learn information about the base key or other user keys.
However, if the matching P ′u is as well known, an attacker
can perform an offline dictionary attack.
Offline Dictionary Attack. Offline dictionary attacks can
always be performed by the service provider, i.e., the service
provider can fully simulate the authentication protocol. Our
approach fully relies on the assumption that the user password
is reasonably strong [26], [2], [27], [28], [33] so that it can
sufficiently be strengthened using a KDF [19]. Because of the
used PAKE protocol, an external attacker can only mount an
offline dictionary attack if either the service provider actively
leaks Ppi and Vpi or the attacker is able to compromise the
service provider.
Password Update and Parameter Ageing. At any point, the
user may want to change to a more secure password or use
more secure base key parameters. The user has to be aware
that there is no way to force the service provider to discard
old Ppi and Vpi values. Thus, a malicious service provider
may choose the weakest available user key parameters for a
dictionary attack.
User key parameters, which deemed to be secure at the time
of account creation may “age” over time and become insecure
with the emergence of more powerful hardware. This means
accounts can become vulnerable over time. Data encrypted
with an encryption key that is based on an outdated base
key should be re-encrypted. However, as before, a malicious
service provider can still mount an attack on an older version
of the encrypted data that is encrypted using weaker user key
parameters. For this reason, data that should be stored long-
term should be encrypted using a high-entropy password [26],
[2], [27], [28], [33].
Parameter Attack. In a parameter attack, the service provider
reports tempered, weak, authentication parameters P ′K when
requested by the user. In this way, the user is tricked to
authenticate with a weak authentication key pi′. The attack is
applicable if the service provider is able to learn information
about pi′ during the authentication protocol. In this case, the
service provider may perform a dictionary attack on pi′.
For example, the Secure Remote Password (SRP) proto-
col [20] is vulnerable to parameter attack when used in our
scenario. In this protocol, the client sends a value M1 =
H(A(gpi
′
)u)b to the service provider. Here, H is a one-way
hash function and A, u, b parameters known to the service
provider. When, due to the parameter attack, pi′ is a low-
entropy key, this equation can be solved by the service provider
using a dictionary attack. Similarly, the Schnorr protocol [21]
requires a high entropy secret. A parameter attack can be
avoided by protocols designed for low entropy authentication
keys [23], [22].
This makes approaches that use key stretching to derive a
strong authentication key while not requiring an authentication
protocol that assumes a weak authentication key vulnerable.
For example, the password manager Passpet uses SRP [1]
while Van Laer at al. [12] are using the Schnorr protocol.
V. COMPACT PAKE PROTOCOL
An asymmetric PAKE protocol usually requires the ex-
change of six messages between the client and the service
provider [22], [34]. To derive the login key pi, the user first
has to request the authentication parameters Ppi from the
service provider which adds two additional messages to the
PAKE protocol. In the following, we propose CompactPAKE,
a PAKE protocol that only requires four messages including
the retrieval of Ppi . Our approach is based on existing proven
secure building blocks, i.e., the symmetric PAKE protocol
EKE2 [23] and a simple authentication scheme used for the
B-Speke protocol [34].
Registration. For the registration, the user generates an
authentication key pi from some chosen authentication param-
eters Ppi . The user chooses a cyclic group generator g and
calculates h = gpi , which is used as the verification value Vpi .
User A : username, pw Provider B : h, Ppi
1)
request Ppi
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
2) x
R←−{1, . . . , |G|}
B ‖ Eh(gx) ‖ Ppi ‖ gc cR←−{1, . . . , |G|}
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
3) pi ← U(pw, Ppi), v ← (gc)pi
y
R←−{1, . . . , |G|}
sk ← H(A ‖ B ‖ gx ‖ gy ‖ gxy) Eh(gy) ‖ Esk(v)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
4) sk ← H(A ‖ B ‖ gx ‖ gy ‖ gxy)
H(sk ‖ 1)
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 2. The CompactPAKE protocol.
The user deploys h and the authentication parameters Ppi at
the service provider.
Authentication. CompactPAKE closely resembles the sym-
metric EKE2 protocol [23], where the user A is the verifier and
the service provider B is the prover. The protocol (Figure 2)
works as follows.
1) The user requests the authentication parameters Ppi .
2) The service provider generates the random values x and
c and sends back the service provider id B, Eh(gx), Ppi
and gc (with Eh an encryption function).
3) The user derives pi, calculates v = (gc)pi , generates a
random value y and the session key sk = H(A ‖ B ‖
gx ‖ gy ‖ gxy) is calculated. The user responses to the
service provider with Eh(gy) and Esk(v).
4) The service provider derives the session key sk = H(A ‖
B ‖ gx ‖ gy ‖ gxy) and uses sk to decrypt v. If v is not
equal hc the protocol is terminated. Otherwise, the user
is authenticated and the service provider responds with
H(sk ‖ 1).
5) The user verifies that the user’s version of H(sk ‖ 1)
matches the received value from the service provider. If
the values do not match, the protocol is terminated.
Correctness. Concerning user authentication, only Step 4
differs from EKE2 [23]. This step is correct since v = (gc)pi =
hc.
Security Analysis. There are two main differences to the
EKE2 protocol [23]. First, because the user starts with the
parameter request, the EKE2 part is started by the service
provider rather by the user. Second, the user is authenticated
with an asymmetric approach. In the following, we analyse
the differences in detail.
In Step 1, the user solely requests the login parameters Ppi .
In Step 2 the service provider sends B ‖ Eh(gx), which is
identical to the first step of EKE2. Furthermore, the service
provider sends Ppi and the random challenge gc, which both
do not reveal any sensitive information to an attacker.
In Step 3, the user sends Eh(gy), which is again the same as
in EKE2. However, differently to EKE2, the user sends Esk(v).
From EKE2, it is known that the session key sk can only be
calculated correctly by both parties if both parties know h.
This means the service provider learns the correct v only if h
is known. Since v = (gc)pi = (gpi)c = hc, the service provider
does not learn any new information other than the fact that the
user not only knows h but also pi. Step 4 is again identical to
EKE2.
VI. PASSWORD MANAGER
To provide a complete authentication solution and to demon-
strate the flexibility of AuthStore, we present a password
manager that can securely store arbitrary credentials (e.g., web
login passwords) at any AuthStore provider.
Password managers have been widely discussed [16], [32],
[1], [35], [36] for which reason we focus on the management
of CompactPAKE user keys and how this can speed up the
registration and authentication at AuthStore service providers.
A. Design
The design of the proposed password manager is as fol-
lows. To securely store key material the password manager
uses password protected encrypted storage as described in
Section IV-D.
The encrypted password manager as well as encryption
parameters Pdata (Section IV-D) are kept and managed locally
but can be synchronised to an AuthStore service provider, i.e.,
the encrypted password manager and Pdata are stored at the
AuthStore service provider.
Using this approach users can login to the AuthStore service
provider and access the password manager with the same
password (see Figure 3).
B. Implementation
We implemented our prototype as a browser extension to
allow secure web authentication. Note that an implementation
that is loaded with a web page cannot be trusted since the
Fig. 3. A single password is used to access to the encrypted password
manager and for authentication with an AuthStore service provider. The
service provider can not leverage the authentication process to gain access
to the stored data.
service provider can manipulate the provided code [10]. Thus,
a trusted client-side implementation is necessary.
Our implementation can be used to store general web login
passwords as well as service provider user keys. Furthermore,
the browser extension offers support to authenticate at arbitrary
AuthStore service providers. This can be used to remove the
hard task from web developer to implement web authentication
pages securely [2], i.e., our browser extension can be leveraged
for user authentication. The source code of our implementation
can be accessed on6.
C. Discussion
In the following we discuss the advantages of the proposed
password manager.
Avoiding expensive key derivation. The derivation of a user
key from a password can, depending on the chosen base key
parameters, take a considerable time. One way to mitigate this
problem is to reuse base keys for multiple service providers.
However, a more general solution is to store user keys in the
proposed password manager. Thus, user keys derived from
different base keys can be cached in the password manager.
Note, that no base keys should be stored in the password
manager. This prevents that even when the content of the
password manager is inadvertently exposed to an attacker,
other user keys which are not stored in the password manager
stay secure. Furthermore, the base key can continued to be
used for future user keys.
Password-less registration. The password manager can sim-
plify the user registration at new AuthStore service providers
by removing the need for letting users choose a new au-
thentication password but only requiring users to enter a
new username. For this to work, the password manager
uses existing base key parameters and automatically derive a
new authentication key. Reusing previously derived base keys
can avoid the expensive KDF evaluation, e.g., by using the
base key parameters used to unlock the password manager.
By proposing a previously used username to the user, the
registration can be further simplified and becomes as easy as
clicking a “Register” button.
6gitlab.com/czeidler/authstore
Resilient against lose of the password manager. Another
advantage of our approach is that reliable storage of the
password manager is not a hard requirement, i.e., the user
remains able to authenticate at AuthStore service providers
even without the password manager. This is especially useful
if the user does not own a cloud storage account at a service
provider and only stores the password manager locally. While
the password manager makes authentication more efficient, the
user only needs to remember her username and password to
authenticate at a service provider using CompactPAKE, i.e., no
other information from the password manager is needed. This
obviously fails when the set of passwords becomes too large
to remember. However, CompactPAKE makes single password
usage secure and the ability to easily change a password
(Section IV-E) makes a single password scenario possible.
VII. RELATED WORK
Another group of authentication protocols leverage the use
of external devices, such as mobile phones [37], [38], or uses
a credential server [11].
There is a lot of work on password-based authentication
protocols. While Wu et al. assume a strong password [20],
more recent protocols such as PAKE protocols can work
with weak passwords in order to prevent attackers to perform
dictionary attacks on the exchanged information [48], [23],
[22]. Asymmetric versions of PAKE protocols prevent an
attacker to impersonate a user when compromising a service
provider [49], [34], [22]. The proposed CompactPAKE pro-
tocol is closely related to EKE2 [23] but is more compact,
includes user key parameter retrieval, and asymmetric authen-
tication [22].
BetterAuth uses a PAKE scheme for authentication but
it does not cover password stretching [50]. Similar to our
work, Van Laer et al. propose to use a KDF for password
stretching and to store the required salt parameter at the
service provider [12]. Compared to our work, they only use
pre-defined KDF parameters, such as CPU cost, and only
have configurable salt, which makes their approach inflexible
regarding account ageing (see Section IV). Furthermore, they
use the Schnorr protocol [21], which is vulnerable to parameter
attacks, e.g., when the provider returns a manipulated salt
value.
An interesting KDF approach that is not vulnerable against
parameter attacks is a Halting KDF (HKDF) [39], [40]. When
evaluating an HKDF, the user executes a KDF algorithm till
a halting parameter is encountered. An invalid password can
not be discarded with absolute certainty. This results in more
than 3 times more work for an attacker when performing a
dictionary attack [39]. The HPAKE authentication protocol
uses an HKDF and stores the required halting parameter at the
predefine provider [51]. The halting parameters are concealed
from external attackers using a hidden credential retrieval
scheme [11] to make offline dictionary attacks for external
attackers impossible. Using HPAKE, a parameter attack would
not be feasible since the user’s HKDF calculation would not
terminate. A disadvantage of HKDFs is the usability issue that
TABLE I
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT SHCEMES.
Scheme Simplicity Secure Password Storage Secure Authentication Data Storage
Password hashing [10] 3 7(dictionary attacks) 7 -
Strengthen password hashing [35] 3 7(fixed parameters) 7 -
HPAKE [39], [40] 3 3 3 -
Secret sharing [32] 7(setup requires n servers) 3 3 -
Decoy passwords [41], [42] 3 7(see [43]) - (not discussed) -
Physical devices [44], [45], [46], [47] 7(requires physical device) 3 3(relies on physical device) 3
Pvault [16] 3 3 7 7
Cloud-based Password Manager [15] 3 3 7 7
Passpet [1] 3 3 7(parameter attack) 7
AuthStore 3 3 3 3
a user, who accidentally entered a wrong password, does not
get a timely feedback about the mistake. Our approach works
with any conventional state of the art KDFs.
Another group of authentication protocols leverage the use
of external devices, such as mobile phones [37], [38], or uses
a credential server [11]. In our work, no extra device or server
is needed for the authentication with the service provider.
Password Management. A server-less approach that allows
a user to reuse a password on multiple web sites is to derive
an authentication key using a hash function that takes the
domain name and the password as arguments [10]. Since
this approach is vulnerable to dictionary attacks, it has been
proposed to apply the hash function n times to strengthen
the password [35]. However, n is a hard-coded value, which
means the approach cannot be adapted to future hardware.
Moreover, these approaches suffer from the problem that the
site password can not be changed without changing the master
password or to remember additional state information.
One way to store the password manager’s master key
(but not the password manager itself) is to leverage secret
sharing [32].This approach requires a set of storage servers
from which at least a certain subset is not compromised by an
attacker.
Decoy passwords (honeywords) or honey encryption can be
used to protect passwords to make online attacks difficult [41],
[42]. However, recent work showed that real passwords can be
distinguished from decoy passwords with high accuracy [43]
Some other approaches leverages user devices, such as
mobile devices [44], [45], [46] or a smart card [47] to protect
the user password. A common issue is that losing the user
devices also means to lose access to the password store and a
local backup of the device needs to be maintained manually.
Pvault offers encrypted cloud based data storage and pass-
word management but uses the same password for data
encryption and for authenticate at the storage server [16].
Zhao et al. use a KDF to protect a password store on secure
reliable cloud storage but only a simple authentication method
is assumed [15], i.e., the service provider must be trusted.
Passpet uses the same simple key stretching technique as
used by Halderman et al. [35] but stores KDF parameters
on a Passpet server [1]. However, for authentication, Passpet
uses the Secure Remote Password protocol [20], which is
vulnerable to parameter attacks.
Table I shows which related work fulfils our requirements
from Section II. The data storage requirement is only evaluated
for password managers that store passwords at a server. Only
AuthStore fulfils all requirements, i.e., it provides simple
password based login, passwords can arbitrarily be strengthen,
the authentication protocol doesn’t reveal any information
about the used password, and the authentication password can
securely be used for data storage.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented AuthStore, a secure password-
based authentication method. We showed that a strong authen-
tication method that keeps the user password confidentially
is a requirement for secure password-based encrypted cloud
storage. AuthStore allows users to securely reuse passwords
for authentication at multiple service providers as well as
for secure data encryption. AuthStore only requires a single
service, i.e., a service provider, to operate. Users only need
to remember username and password to authenticate and
access their encrypted data. Using AuthStore, users are in
control of how secure passwords are protected using key
stretching. We discussed a parameter attack and showed how
other solutions are vulnerable to this attack. We presented
CompactPAKE, a compact asymmetric PAKE protocol that
includes the retrieval of key stretching parameters and requires
fewer communication messages than other PAKE protocols.
In a case study, we presented a AuthStore-based password
manager that allows users to securely store arbitrary credential
such as web login passwords in the cloud. We showed how
the password manager helps to make user registration and
authentication at service providers that support CompactPAKE
faster and more convenient.
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